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International banking has been a rapidly this approach to thealternatives ofeitherdealing
growing industry since the mid-1960's. This with a local institution or, more expensively,
paper will analyze two important aspects ofthat dealing with a far-distant banking facility.
development, the activities ofAmerican banks in The United States and Japan present ideal
Japan and the activities ofJapanese banks in the countries for a study comparing international
United States. The study will attempt to deter- banking activity. Since 1972, trade between the
mine empirically the economic factors (such as two countries-measured as the sum ofexports
growing bilateral trade and expanding local plus imports computed in dollar terms-has
markets) which influence the growth of these approximately tripled, and their banks' foreign
institutions, and to determine whether these activities have grown rapidly. In addition, the
factors have affected the twogroupsofbanks in a activities of both countries' banks in the other
similar manner in the period from November country are heavily concentrated either in local-
1972 to November 1978. 1Numerous studies have market activity or in international trade involv-
analyzed international banking in general, the ing the home or host country. Thus data on the
role offoreign banks in a particular country, or activities of these institutions can be analyzed in
the international activities of banks based in a relation to local economic activity and home or
particular foreign country. However, no previ- host country trade. By contrast, comparable
ous study has systematically attempted to study analysis is impossible for branches of non-local
international banking on a bilateral basis.2 banks in Continental Europe, or in financial
This study will focus primarily on the lending centers such as London, Hong Kong, Singapore,
activities of each country's banks from banking and Nassau, since foreign banking offices in
offices located in the other country. This focus these countries deal in large part with customers
on banking activities from foreign offices places in other than the home or host country.
the paper within a broader context of foreign A final reason for this interest in a study of
investment. Such an approach is useful because Japanese and American banks concerns the
it isolates for analysis a large and rapidly grow- differences in regulatory attitudes in the two
ing segment of international banking for both countries towards bankingin general and foreign
countries' banks. The rapid growth of foreign banks in particular. American regulatory au-
branch and subsidiary activities by both Japa- thorities place few restrictions on the balance-
nese and American banks indicates a customer sheet structure, such as quantitative ceilings on
preference for obtaining banking services-such lending, ofbanks operatinginthe United States.3
as access to credit, deposit, and payment By contrast, the balance-sheet positions ofbanks
facilities-from the office ofa bank with which operating in Japan are much more tightly moni-
they are familiar in a country where they are tored and controlled by the Bank of Japan.4
conducting business. Customers much prefer Many ofthese same regulatory attitudes carry
over to activities ofnon-local banks. The United
States has traditionally been open to entry by
foreign banks. In fact, until the passage of the
International Banking Act of 1978, foreign
banks (subject to state law) had the advantageof
18being able to operatefull-fledged bankingoffices
in more than one state, a privilege generally
denied to U.S. banks. The state laws ofthe major
financial centers were generallyquite liberal with
respect to entry by foreign banks. Foreignbanks
operating in the United States have been permit-
ted agency, branch, and subsidiary forms of
operation.5
Japanese authontles, however, have used
more restraint in permitting foreign bank entry.
With a few exceptions extending back to the
immediate postwar period, they have limited
foreign banks to operations at a single branch
facility, which has effectively kept those banks
from entering retail banking on any significant
scale. In addition, theauthorities in the past have
adopted SOme measures designed to limit the
access of non-local banks to local sources of
funds. 6 This study will attempt to analyze wheth-
er differences in the local environment have had
any measurable impact on the growth in lending
by Japanese branches of U.S. banks.
I. Conceptual Framework
The term international banking covers a wide
variety of transactions, including deposit and
loan transactions by a bank's indigenous offices
with residents of other countries, and the estab-
lishment offoreign branchesand subsidiaries for
the conduct of banking activities in foreign
countries. International banking, when conduct-
ed through foreign branches and subsidiaries, is
really a subtopic of the broader topic offoreign
investment, since in theorya bankcouldconduct
international-banking activities from its domes-
tic offices. Richard E. Caves in a survey article
suggests that foreign investment is often asso-
ciated with product differentiation, which may
include possession ofintangible assets such as a
firm's knowledge about how to produce and
distribute its product.? In Caves' model a firm
has a definite home-country identity (including
language), but elects to invest abroad to adapt
"the firm's basic product to local demand condi-
tions."8 A firm rarely invests abroad to produce
something it does not produce in its domestic
market.
The Caves' model offoreign investmentcan be
applied to international banking. Major banks
offer a differentiated product and the knowledge
(intangible assets) to serve the financial needs of
their major corporate customers. Banks estab-
lish their branches and subsidiaries abroad to
adapt their basic product to local conditions,
rather than attempt to "export" banking serv-
ices from their head offices. Virtually all banks
operating abroad were majorproducers ofbank-
ing services in their home country prior to their
investments abroad.
Caves' model suggests that a U.S. bank estab-
lishes its banking presence in Japan largely
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because its traditional customers have a demand
for banking services in Japan, and a preference
for conducting business with a bank with whom
they have an established relationship. Caves'
model is also consistent with the notion of
"cross-hauling" of international banking serv-
ices, since Japanese banks have a specialized
differentiated product to market to their tradi-
tional Japanese customers seeking bankingserv-
ices in the United States.
Vernon and Wells analyze the expansion of
multinational banks in somewhat similarterms.9
Their explanation centers upon factors such as
technological capabilities and trade names, i.e.,
the preferences of customers to deal with banks
that are well-known to them, most often through
previous associations. Vernon and Wells also
suggest that economies ofscale are important in
multinational banking. Economies ofscale occur
when each foreign branch and subsidiary con-
tributes to the bank's profitability by enhancing
the bank's ability to portray itself as a world-
wide institution. Within a local market, econo-
mies ofscale mayexist because ofa bank'sability
to collect and disseminate information on local
economic conditions, laws, regulations, and
business opportunities.
Finally, foreign investment may be the only
feasible way for a bank to expand its activities-
a point which is ignored by the several authors
cited. A bank's home market might be relatively
unprofitable due to competition, or legal re-
strictions might limit its ability toexpand locally.
For example, U.S. laws prohibiting multistate
branches are a constraint on many U.S. banks.
Caves, as well as Vernon and Wells, help
explain the motivation for large banks to es-tablish foreign facilities to service the foreign
activities oftheirlargecorporatecustomers,who
much prefer to maintain their relationships with
certain banksratherthanpurchase bankingserv-
ices from banks with whom they have had little
past contact. In this situation, the typicalforeign
branch's loan demand would exceed its deposit
base, since corporations are on balance large net
borrowers from banks. Moreover, while the loan
and advisory services of a foreign bank may be
tailored to the special needs of its traditional
customers, an institution of that type normally
would be unable to offer deposit facilities mark-
edly different from those offered by local
banks. 1O In essence, foreign banks typically have
a core mix ofcustomers who are loan-oriented,
and theirdeposits are not perceived to be superi-
orto local bankdeposits-infact, whendenomi-
nated in local currency they may be perceived to
be inferior, because oftheir lack ofaccess to local
central-bank credit in a liquiditysqueeze. Conse-
quently, offices offoreign banks typically would
have to rely on non-deposit sources of funds,
such as interbank borrowings and net advances
from their parent institutions, to finance their
loan activities.
The Caves and Vernon-Wells approaches to
foreign investment help explain the initial es-
tablishment of a foreign office, but they fail to
explain the second stage ofexpansion-thestage
when banks go beyond servicing the financial
needs of their traditional customers. This stage
occurs after a bank has borne the fixed costs of
establishing a foreign presence for its traditional
relationships. In this second stage, the foreign
bank utilizes its contacts in the local market to
compete for local business with established
banks. The foreign bank may be able to offer a
differentiated product, such as advice to local
companies desiring to do business in its own
home market, or certain international services
where it has special expertise. I I However, the
foreign bank may be unwilling or unable to
differentiate its product, andso maycompetefor
local business simply on the basis of price,
particularly if the local banking market is char-
acterized by a degree of monopoly power.
A foreign bank's ability to compete in a local
market will depend upon a variety of factors,
including the strength and quality ofits manage-
ment as well as the size and growth ofthe local
market. The latter factor is important, since it is
easierto enter andexpand in a largeandgrowing
market than one that is stagnant orcontracting.
Indeed, local-market entrydepends ona number
offactors-the attitude and policies ofbothhost
and home country regulatory authorities, the
growth of trade between the home and host
country and between the host country and the
rest of the world, the presence or absence of
exchange controls or controls over profit remit-
tances in the host country, the foreign banks'
assessment ofthe host country's ability to main-
tain political and economic stability, and so on.
Profitability ofexpandinginto new markets may
also be affected by the ease or tightness of the
host country's banking system, and to some
extent by both the home and host countries'
foreign-reserve positions, to the extent that they
affect either country's banking system.
II. Basic Data and Concepts
The relevant data on the activities of U.S.
banks in Japan, and on theactivities ofJapanese
banks in the United States, focus ontransactions
with nonbank customers (Tables 1-3). A bank's
foreign branches are often active in local inter-
bank markets, for investment and liquidity pur-
poses. Transactions in interbank markets, how-
ever, are rarely the raison d'etre for incurringthe
costs ofenteringa foreign market, since margins
in such markets tend to be extremely narrow.
Moreover, banks can handle interbank transac-
tions at their head offices or in offshore banking
centers at a smallfraction ofthecost ofestablish-
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ing a banking facility in the United States or
Japan. On the other hand, a branch can use
interbank transactionsas a means ofadjustingits
liquidity position, so that it isn'tforced to rely on
the bank's head office. Interbank borrowings
may be an important net source of funds to a
newly-established office ofa foreign bank which
is not well-known to local nonbank depositors.
Overall, transactions with nonbanks represent
the best measure ofthe success offoreign banks
in developing a customer base in the local mar-
ket.The key comparisons in the tables are those
between non-local banking offices and the local
institutions with whom the foreign banks would
be expected to be in direct competition. Forthe
United States, the offices ofJapanese banks are
compared to the approximately 300 large banks
that reported weekly to the Federal Reserve in
the 1972-78 period. These"moneycenter"banks
account for slightly over one-halfofthe assets of
all U.S. banks. They also account for an over-
Whelming proportion of the international capa-
bilities of U.S. banks, and are the principal
competitors oftheforeign banks operatingin the
United States.
For Japan, the branches of U.S. banks are
compared to the large City Bankswhichaccount
for about one-half of the assets of all Japanese
banks. The City Banks tend to be more heavily
involved in international finance and corporate
lending than other types of Japanese banking
institutions.12 Thus, they appear to be generally
similar to the weekly reporting U.S. banksin size
and business orientation. 13 The datain thetables
Comparisons: Japanese Market
Between late 1972 and late 1976, U.S. bank
activity in Japan grew extremely rapidly, as U.S.
bank branch claims on nonbanks (mostly loans)
nearly quadrupled (Table 1). Also, these claims
increased in size from l.3 percent to 2.7 percent
ofcomparable loans and discounts at the City
Banks. Since late 1977, however, lending by U.S.
banks in Japan has shown little growth, and has
actually declined from 2.7 percent to 2.3 percent
of lending by the City Banks.
The record for liabilities to nonbanks (mainly
deposits) is roughly similar, althoughthis depos-
it ratio peaked somewhat earlier than the loan
ratio. More strikingly, however, the liabilities
(deposit) ratioovertime has averaged onlyabout
one-third as high as the claims (loan) ratio. This
result is consistent with the theorythatnon-local
banks, with their heavy mix of corporate cus-
tomers, would have loans in excess of their
deposit resources.
refer to the ratio of the foreign balance-sheet
item to the comparable item for the domestic
banks. Thus, the percentages refer to the size of
the foreign banks' activity divided by the closest
comparable measure for the local banks, i.e., a
ratio rather than a share.
Comparisons: U.S. Market
Japanese banks operating in the United States
have expanded at a different pace than U.S.
banks operating in Japan (Table 2). But first,
some introductory remarks are needed to ex-
plain why the data are arranged as they are.
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I For branches of U.S. banks, data refer to claims on and liabilities to nonbanks from FR2052 reports. (Data include
customers' liabilities on acceptances.)
2 For Japanesecity Banks, data refer to loans. discounts, and customers' liabilities on acceptances from Economic Statistics
Monthly published by The Bank of Japan.
3 For Japanese banks, data refer to total private deposits (which eXclude official and interbank deposits) from Economic
Statistics Monthly published by The Bank of Japan.
21The Japanese-bank data are tabulated for
agencies and branches, and separately for aU
institutions, which include U.S.-incorporated
subsidiary commercial banks operated byJapa-
nese banks. This is done because subsidiaries
have a different business orientation than agen-
ciesandbranches, being muchmoreretailorient-
ed; and secondly, because operating asubsidiary
commercial bank is a privilege available to
Japanese banks in the United States but not to
U.S. banks in Japan.
The loan focus is confined to commercial and
industrial loans, which account for about four-
fifths of the U.S. lending activities of Japanese
banks. Narrowing the focus in this way restricts
the comparisons to similar lending by large U.S.
banks. Also, this facilitates comparisonswiththe
activities in Japan of both U.S.-bank branches
and large Japanese City Banks, since both
groups of banks limit their lending primarily to
commercial and industrial enterprises.'4
Over the period studied, Japanese bank lend-
ing increased steadily relative to lending by large
domestic U.S. banksI5-except for the period
between late 1974 and late 1977, when Japanese
banks' foreign activities were restrained by the
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan.
Altogether, between November 1972 and No-
vember 1978, the ratio ofcommercial-industrial
lending of Japanese agencies and branches to
U.S. weekly reporting banks increased from 5.2
percent to 9.7 percent, while the ratio for all
Japanese institutions (including subsidiaries)
increased even faster, from 6.1 percent to I1.5
percent. Thus, the ability ofJapanese banks to
operate subsidiary commercial banks in the
United States enhanced their ability to grow
faster than domestic banks. 16
Japanese-bank liabilities to nonbanks (depos-
its) showeda similarupward trend. As in thecase
of U.S. banks in Japan, Japanese-bank deposits
in this country have lagged considerably behind
their loans to nonbanks, reflecting theirconcen-
tration with corporate customers. But their de-
posits have risen sharply because oftwo impor-
tant factors. First, many Japanese banks
previously operated in New York as agencies
(which cannot accept deposits) rather than as
branches (which are deposit-taking institu-
tions).17 But between January and September
1977, the number ofagencies ofJapanese banks
in the United States declined from 32 to 23, and
the number ofbranches increased from 9to 25. 18
Japanese banks made this conversion largely
to take advantage ofthe domestic CDmarket. In
some earlier years, they had been forced to paya
premium to attract CDs in the U.S. market.
However, in more recent years, Japanese banks
Table 2
Activities of Japanese Banks in the United States
(millions of dollars)
Commercial and Industrial Loans Liabilities to Nonbanks2
As Percent of U.S. As Percenl of U.S.
Weekly Reporting Weekly Reporting
Amount Banks Amount Banks ---
Agencies Agencies Agencies Agencies
and Aliinsli- and Alllnsll- and Aliinsti- and All Insli-
Date Branches tutions3 Branches lutions3 Branches lutions3 Branches tutions3
November 1972 4.558 5.391 5.2 6.1 170 1.647 .06 .60
November 1973 6.875 7.774 6.4 7.2 280 1.943 .09 .64
November 1974 9.213 10,414 7.2 8.1 307 2,351 .09 .70
November 1975 8.643 10.138 7.2 8.6 635 3.910 .19 1.14
November 1976 8.278 9.989 7.4 8.8 679 4,459 .20 1.30
November 1977 8.843 10.775 7.3 8.9 1,447 5.887 .38 1.54
November 1978 13,498 15.965 9.7 11.5 2.652 8,453 .64 2.05
I For U.S. offices of Japanese banks. data derived from FR886a monthly reports.
2 Liabilities to nonbanks include deposits and credit balances.
3 Includes subsidiary commercial banks in addition to agencies and branches.
22have been able to market their CDs on compar-
able (or nearly comparable) terms as U.S.
banks. 19 The shift reflected thegrowingfinancial
strength of the Japanese banks, combined with
the growing reserves ofthe BankofJapan, which
assured the Japanese banks a strong lender of
last resort. As a result ofthese changing condi-
tions, total nonbank deposits ofJapanese agen-
cies and branches tripled between November
1976 and May 1978, and their size increased
relative to total nonbank deposits at large U.S.
banks.20
A second factor contributing to the rapid
growth of deposits at U.S. offices of Japanese
banks is the growth ofthe subsidiary commercial
banks, with their ability to offer a wide range of
deposits. The data in Table 2 indicate that sub-
sidiaries accounted for nearly two-thirds of the
increase in the growth ofthe ratio ofdeposits of
Japanese banks in the United States relative to
the large weekly reporting banks.
Sources of Funds
U.S. banks in Japan, and Japanese banks in
this country, have both had to rely heavily on
nondeposit sources offunds (Table 3),21 because
for both groups ofbanks, liabilities to nonbanks
represent a relatively small proportion ofclaims
on nonbanks. However, while for the offices of
U.S. banks in Japan, the proportion ofnonbank
claims financed by nonbank liabilities has gener-
ally declined in recent years, the reverse has been
true for agencies and branches of Japanese
banks.
Net liabilities to unrelated banks typically
have represented a major funding source for
non-local banks. However, until recently U.S.-
bank branches in Japan were actually suppliers
of funds to the Japanese interbank market-
reversing the role played by most other foreign
branches of U.S. banks.22 This unique situation
came about largely because of the very tight
(overloaned) position of Japanese City Banks,
who wereforced to depend oninterbankborrow-
ing, as well as the Bank ofJapan, to meet heavy
loan demands. In contrast, Japanese agencies
and branches in the United States have tended to
be large net borrowers of funds from other
banks, since 1973 funding from one-halfto three-
fifths of their U.S. lending from that source.
Net advances from parent banks have repre-
sented yet another source of funds. 23 Typically
nonlocal banks, both in the United States and
abroad, fund a proportion of their local activity
with advances from their related offices. U.S.
bank branches in Japan have relied heavily on
such advances to finance their lending activities,
particularly in the 1974-76 period when the
Table 3
Major Balance Sheet Characteristics of Branches of U.S. Banks in Japan,
and of Agencies and Branches of Japanese Banks in the United States
(millions of dollars)
Branches of U.S. Banks In Japan U.S. Agencies and Branches of Japanese Banks
As Percent of Claims on Nonbanks As Percent of Claims on Nonbanks
Amount liabilities Net Advances Amount liabilities Net Advances
Claims on to Non- liabilities from Claims on loNon- liabilities from
Date Nonbanks banks to Banks Parent Nonbanks' banks 10 Banks Parent
November 1972 2,020 31.3 -32.4 55.8 4,558 3.7 21.6 81.7
November 1973 3,263 35.2 10.1 40.2 6,875 4.1 57.8 35.6
November 1974 4,618 31.5 -61.4 96.6 9,213 3.3 61.3 26.0
November 1975 6,458 24.7 -26.6 83.2 8,643 7.3 56.8 32.5
November 1976 7.806 21.4 -10.8 73.5 8.278 8.2 56.3 29.2
November 1977 9.137 23.3 - 2.5 61.8 8.843 16.4 47.7 19.9
November 1978 9,384 23.9 10.7 52.4 13,498 19.6 53.2 28.0
I Includes only commercial and industrial loans.
23Japanese banking system was in a very tight
position. But U.S. banks' reliance on their relat-
ed offices for funding has declined considerably
since 1976. The U.S. agencies and branches of
Japanese banks have followed a somewhat simi-
larpattern, reducing their reliance on parent
institutions in recent years as they developed
alternative sources of funding.
IU. An EmpiricaLM<x!el
It was suggested in Section I that the growth
and character of banking activities in a foreign
country could be explained by various economic
factors, such as the level of international trade,
the growth of the local market, and banking
conditions in both the host and home countries.
In this section a simple model is constructed to
test whether lending to nonbanks by U.S. banks
in Japan and Japanese banks in the United
States can be explained by such economic vari-
ables.
As noted earlier, the principal reason why
foreigr banks establish banking offices in either
Japan or the United States is to make loans to
nonbank borrowers. It is expected that such
lending would be affected by several directly
observable economic factors, Since nonloca!
banks tend to be trade oriented, their activities
should be affected by international trade flows.
For both U.S. banks in Japan, and Japanese
banks in the United States, the most likely
measure would be total Japanese trade, defined
as the sum ofJapanese imports and exports-or
alternatively, total trade between the United
States and Japan. U.S. bank branches in Japan,
however, help finance Japanese tradewith coun-
tries other than the United States, and thus their
growth should be more closely related to total
Japanese trade rather than simply U.S.-Japan
trade.
For Japanese banks in the United States, the
picture is somewhat different. Because of the
importance of New York as a financial center,
and because of the role of the dollar in settling
international transactions, a large proportion of
total Japanese trade (including non-U.S. trade)
is financed at the U.S. offices of Japanese
banks.24 There is little evidence to indicate that
these offices finance significant amounts ofnon-
Japanese related trade, i.e., tradewhich is neither
an export from nor an import into Japan. Thus
total Japanese trade will be utilized as an ex-
planatory variable in the equations for lending
by U.S. offices of Japanese banks.
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A second variable affecting the growth of
nonlocalbanks is the growth in the size of the
local market. Clearly it is easier for a foreign
bank toexpand its activities in a growing market.
Forthe United States, thelocal market is defined
as commercial and industrial loans by weekly
reporting banks; for Japan, it is defined as total
loans and discounts of City Banks.
A third set of variables affecting non-
indigenous banks includes the tightness or ease
ofbanking conditions in both the host and home
countries. In particular, tight conditions in the
host country, as measured by a high loan/de-
posit ratio, would be expected to encouragelend-
ing by nonlocal banks, because local banks
would experience difficulty servicing their loan
demand with existing resources. Conversely, a
high loan/deposit ratio in the home country
might exert a negative effect, as banks which
were loaned up in their home market would be
less able to expand lending at their foreign
branches. The loan/deposit ratios function as
proxies for the profitability of bank lending. By
assumption, a banking system with a high loan/
deposit ratio will provide foreign banks with
profitable opportunities, particularly if they are
able to bring in funds from abroad. In effect, a
relatively tight position in local markets should
mean higher interest spreads earned by banks.25
Another explanatory factor would be Japan's
international-reserve position.26 Because of Ja-
pan's growing reserve accumulation, the Bank of
Japan has placed dollar balances with Japanese
banks, usually at attractive rates, and thus put
those banks in a better competitive position to
extend dollar credits at their home offices (often
termed "impact" loans) and at their offices
abroad.27 Moreover, because of those growing
reserves, the Bank of Japan can now act as a
powerful lenderoflast resort, a feature lacking in
1974 and 1975 when Japanese banks were re-
quired to pay a premium over market rates to
obtain deposits. 28To test these several hypotheses, regression
equations were computed for lending by the two
groups of banks. To avoid problems of serial
correlation, the equations were run on first
differences in totallendingto nonbanks, andalso
for all the explanatory variables. In the case of
U.S.-based Japanese banks, serial correlation in
the first differences was eliminated by use of
Cochrane-Orcutt procedures. Because of the
severe inflation of the 1972-78 period, the data
were transformed to real (November 1972) dol-
lars to estimate the variouseffects in real terms.29
By doing so, the lending impact of changes in
loan/deposit ratios could be analyzed without
overweighting the later observations because of
inflation-caused increases in nominal values.
Increases in lending based on increases in the
size of the local market and the growth in total
Japanese trade were assumed to be nearlysimul-
taneous,because trade requires immediate fi-
nancing and the growth of the local market
affects loan demand fairly quickly. Changes in
lending in response to changes in home and host
countryloan/depositratioswereestimated using
Almon lags with third-degree polynomials. Dis-
tributed lags were used because, in a given
month, .a nonlocal bank generally does not
adjust its lending immediately to conditions
prevailing at the end of the previous month, but
rather responds to a weighted average of previ-
ous conditions in the home and host countries'
bankingsystems. For example, a nonlocal bank
may not adjust its lending at all to a single
month's sharp increase in the loan/deposit ratio
in the host country if it believes the increase has
been caused by temporary factors. A longer lag
was utilized for the host country (I8 months)
than for the home country (6 months), becausea
Table 4
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I Coefficient based on 18-month Almon lag. 2 Coefficient based on 6-month Almon lag. t statistics in parentheses
25foreign office's lending can be adjusted more
quickly by home-office direction than by re-
sponses to changing local-marketdevelopments.
Changes in lending in response to changes in
Japanese reserves were estimated withsix-month
lags.
Despite problems of random fluctuations re-
sulting from using banking data derived from
single-date observations, and problemsassociat-
ed with using data from different sources, the
model does quite well explaining growth in
lending by the two countries' banks (Table 4).30
Changes in lending by U.S. banks in Japan are
positively related to growth in lending by local
banks, growth in totalJapanese trade (although
only at the 90-percent confidence level), and
changes in the tightness ofthe Japanese banking
system. Changes in U.S. bank lending in Japan
are negatively related to changes in the tightness
of the domestic U.S. market, and to changes in
the growth ofJapanese reserves. This last result
suggests that the reserve accumulation of the
Bank of Japan has reduced somewhat the de-
mand for dollar loans from branches of U.S.
banks.
Changes in lending by Japanese banks in the
United States can be explained by these same
economic variables. Growth in lending by such
banks is positively related to the growth of the
local U.S. market, and is very strongly related to
growth in total Japanese trade. Also, their
growthis positively related tochanges in the U.S.
loan/deposit ratio and negatively related to
changes in the Japanese loan/deposit ratio. The
coefficient for the impact ofchanges in Japanese
reserves on changes in lending by U.S.-based
Japanese banks had the expected positive sign,
but was not statistically significant.
In addition to these variables, dummy vari-
ables for December and Januarywere added as a
simple seasonal adjustment to capture differ-
ences in year-end behavior ofJapanese banks in
this country. The coefficients for the agencies
and branches, which tended to be negative for
December and positive in January, suggested
that Japanese banks were less active than U.S.
banks in end-of-year windowdressing.
For Japanese banks, a dummy variable was
added for October 1975 to capture a major
acquisition by the Bank ofTokyo, but this does
26
not appear to have had a significant impact on
growth in commercial and industrial lending.
ForU.S. banks, adummyvariable was addedfor
May 1978 to capture a modification in statistical
reporting procedures, which reduced the number
of U.S. bank branches required to report, and
modified the definitions ofclaims on nonbanks
to exclude claims on publicly-owned corpora-
tions. For both groups of banks, a dummy
variable was added for November 1978 to ac-
countfortheimpact ofthe U.S. policy measures
to support the dollar. The large and highly
significant positive coefficient for Japanese
banks in the United States suggests that the
measures may have induced Japanese banks to
expand lending from their U.S. offices because
of a shift in their exchange-rate expectations,
since lending by these institutions is predomi-
nantly dollar-denominated.
Since the overall model performed quite well,
it is useful tocomparethecoefficientsfor the two
groups of banks for certain key variables. The
most striking difference between the two equa-
tions was in theestimated impact oflocal-market
growth on the activity of foreign banks. For
Japanese branches of U.S. banks, a $l-billion
increase in the size of the local market was
associated with a $13.8-million increase in total
lending to nonbanks; for U.S. offices of Jap-
anese banks, a $l-billion increase in the local
market was associated with a $39.5-million loan
increase for agencies and branches, and a $40.7-
million loan increaseforall institutions. Thusthe
local-market coefficient for Japanese banks in
the United States was about three times as large
as the coefficient for U.S. bank branches in the
Japanese market.3 1
This striking difference in impact of local-
market growth on foreign-bank lending can be
attributed to a variety ofreasons, includingsome
factors such as managerial preferences, which
could not be included as explanatory variables.
One important reason for the difference is that
Japanese corporate borrowers have a much
stronger preference than U.S. corporations for
dealing with their own national banks. Thus,
growth in the local-market demand for credit in
Japan would be directed largely to Japanese
banks.The empirical model has been developed with
the intention of analyzing if restraints on the
entryand expansionofU.S. banks in Japan have
hindered their ability to grow. The results ofthe
equations in Table 4 are consistent with such a
hypothesis, after taking into account all the
economic factors discussed above, because ofthe
significantly lower coefficient for local-market
influence for U.S. banks in Japan than for
Japanese banks in the U.S. The results are
suggestive and not conclusivesince otherfactors,
including managerial decisions which are not
embodied in the model, may account for the
difference.
Another important difference concerns the
impact ofgrowth in total Japanese trade on the
growth of the two groups of banks. For Jap-
anese branches of U.S. banks, a $1-biIlion in-
crease in total Japanese trade was associated
with a $12.1 ~million loan increase. However, the
coefficients were ten times greater for U.S. of-
fices of Japanese banks. In these cases, a $1-
billion increase in total Japanese trade was
associated with a $131.I-miIIion loanincrease by
Japanese agencies and branches, and a $134.9-
million loan increase for all Japanese institu-
tions. The large coefficients estimated for the
U.S. offices of Japanese banks confirm the
market impression that those offices are in fact
very active in financing Japanese trade.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
To summarize, the lending activities ofJapa-
nese and U.S. banks in each other's markets can
be analyzed in terms of certain economic vari-
ables, such as growth in trade and growth ofthe
local banking market. While the variables ex-
plaining the activities ofthe two groups ofbanks
are generally the same, the estimatedcoefficients
vary. In particular, the coefficients indicate that
growth in total Japanese trade strongly affects
lending by U.S. offices ofJapanese banks, rein-
forcing the widely-held view about the impor-
tance of those institutions in financing Japanese
trade. It is interesting to speculate whether the
recent movement towards yen-financing ofJap-
anese trade ("yen-shift") will reduce the role of
Japanese banks in the United States, since trade
financing in dollars is such an important part of
their activity.
A second important finding concerns the
coefficient estimating the impact oflocal-market
growth on foreign-bank loan growth, which is
substantially smaller for American banks in
Japan than for Japanese banks in the United
States. These coefficients have been estimated
afteraccountingfor the effects ofall othermajor
variables, such as trade, banking conditions,
exchange-rate changes, and Japanese reserves.
While a variety of factors may account for this
difference, the significantly lower coefficient for
U.S. banks in Japan is consistent with the inter-
pretation that regulatory restraints have affected
their ability to participate in the growth of the
local market. By contrast, Japanese banks in the
United States have been more free to expand
their branch networks, operatesubsidiary banks,
and develop local sources of funding, and thus
have been better able to benefit from growth in
the local market.
Appendix
Alternative Definitions of local Market Activity
The text of the paper analyzed the growth of Since the definition of local markets must by
the activities of foreign banks relative to the necessity be somewhat arbitrary, this appendix
growth oflocal-market institutions. Clearlysuch will consideralternativedefinitions ofcompeting
comparisons are influenced by the choice of the banks.
local banks with which the foreign banks are The regression equations have been recomput-
compared. The text used the Japanese City ed using alternative definitions of local-market
Banks as the relevant local-market comparison competitors (Table 5). For U.S. banks in Japan,
for branches of U.S. banks in Japan, and the the local market is defined to include the Long-
U.S. weekly reporting banks as the frame of term Credit Banks as well as the City Banks,
reference for U.S. offices of Japanese banks. since U.S. bank branches in Japan extend long-
27termcredits. ForU.s. offices ofJapanesebanks,
the alternative local-market comparison is with
the large weekly reporting banks in·New York,
California, and Illinois. These three financial
marketscontain.most.ofthemajor.money-center
banks with whom the Japanese banks compete
mostdoselY,andaccountforthevastmajorityof
the activities of Japanese banks in the United
States.
Theregressionresults in Table 5appeargener-
ally similar to the results inTable 4, except for a
significant change in coefficients caused by the
modification ofthe definition of local market.
For U.S. bank branches in Japan, inclusion of
the Long-termCreditBanksreducedtheestimat-
ed impact of a $l-billion increase in loans by
local ba.nks from $13.8 million to $11.2 million.
ForJapanese agencies and branches in the Unit-
edStates, restricting the local market to weekly
reporting banks in the three major financial
centers increasedthe estimated impact of a $1-
billion increase in loans by local banks from
$39.5 millionto $43A million.32
The local-market definitions used in Table 4
resulted ina local-market impact three times as
great for Japanese banks in the United Statesas
foru.s. banks in Japan. We mayconciudethat
that figure represents a conservative estimate of
the difference in local-market impact onthetwo
countries' banks, judging from the results ob-
tained from the different local-market defini-
tions in Table 5.
Table 5
Regression Equations Explaining Monthly Changes in Loans to Nonbanks




Change in loans by local banks (billions)
Change in Japanese trade (billions)
Change in loan/deposit (Japan)
Change in loan/deposit' (U.S.A.)
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1 Coefficient based on 18-month Almon lag. 2 Coefficient based on 6··month Almon lag. 3 Local market includes
long-term credit banks in addition to city banks. 4 Local market refers to weekly reporting banks in New York,
Californ{a, and lIIinois. t statistics in parentheses
28FOOTNOTES
1. November 1972 i~ the first date for which compre-
hensive statistics were collected for the U.S. offices of
foreign banks.
2. For papers discussing l).S. operations of foreign
banks and foreign operations of U.S. banks, see Key
Issues in International Ballking, Proceedings of Con-
ference held in October 1977, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston, ConferenceSeries No. 18, and Compendium of
Papers Prepared for the FINE Study, U.S. House of
Representatives, June 1976, Book II, pp. 733-981.
3. Exceptions to this would be required reserves and
efforts by bank regulatory agencies to have banks
increase their capital ratios.
4. In part, this concern results from the "overloaned"
position (loans exceeding deposits) and the relatively
low capital ratios of the major Japanese banks.
5. The principal types of institutions operated by for-
eign banks in the United States are: agencies, which
may lend funds but cannot accept deposits (although
they do accept credit balances which for many pur-
poses are the functional equivalent of deposits);
branches, which may accept deposits, make loans,and
are integral parts of their parents, with lending limits
and deposit support based on the resources of their
parent banks; and, subsidiaries, which are separately-
incorporated U.S. banks (of which at least 50 percentof
the stock is owned by a foreign bank) and which have
lending limits based on their own capital.
6. See Andreas Prindl, "Foreign Banks in Tokyo lose
One Role and look for Another," Euromoney, March
1979, pp. xxxi-xxxiv.
7. Richard E. Caves, International Trade, International
Investment, and Imperfect Markets, Princeton, Interna-
tional Finance Section, Princeton University, 1974.
8. Ibid., p. 18.
9. Raymond Vernon and louis T. Wells, Jr., Economic
Environment of International Business, Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976, esp. pp.
61-64.
10. As one possible exception, a nonlocal bank may
have some advantageoffering depositsdenominated in
its home currency if investors believe that banks would
always have preferential access in world markets to
their home currencies.
11. For example, a particular bank might be known to
be very efficient in the area of funds transfer.
12. For a description of Japanese banking institutions,
see Wilbur F. Monroe, Japan: Financial Markets and
The World Economy, Praeger Publishers, New York,
1973; Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan,
Banking System in Japan; Tokyo, 1976; L.S. Pressnell,
editor, Money and Banking in Japan, MacMillan, lon-
don, 1973; Bank ofJapan, The JapaneseFinancial Sys-
tem, Tokyo, 1978; and Ichiro Matsudaira, "Recent De-
velopments in Japanese Commercial Banking," in The
World Banking Challenge, American Bankers Associa-
tion, Washington, D.C., 1972.
29
13. Restricting the analysis of groups of competing
banks has definite advantages. In particular, it elimi-
nates the activities of many smaller banks which con-
duct retail-oriented businesses in areas in which for-
eign banks are typically not interested in competing.
Therefore, the focus on the larger banks eliminates the
influenceof factors affecting smaller banks, which may
have little or no impact on the custOmers for whom the
foreign and local banks.are COmpeting.
14. While preferable for purposes Of comparability,
both within the United States and between countries,
confining the comparisons to commercial-industrial
loans excludes the limited growth in retail lending by
these institutions. As of November 1978, total retail
(non-C&1l lending by all Japanese institutions in the
United States amounted toonly $3.1 billion, orlessthan
one-sixth of total lendingto nonbanksby U.S. officesof
Japanese banks.
15. For a brief description of the restraints, see "The
Restrictions Are Going," in Euromoney, February1978,
p.13.
16. The data for subsidiary commercial banks for No-
vember 1975 are affected by the acquisition ofCalifor-
nia First National Bank by the Bank ofTokyo in October
1975.
17. California state law restricts foreign banking of-
fices to deposits from non-U.S. residents, because of
their ineligibility for FDIC insurance. The Japanese
preference for operating agencies in New York reflects
the fact that agencies, because they are not deposit-
taking institutions, are generally not subject to lending
limits.
18. Agencies do in fact accept credit balances, which
are usually undrawn portions of a credit. Credit bal-
ances are, however, a very limited way to raise funds
from nonbank sources.
19. The desire of Japanese banks to expand their CD
base is also indicated by activity at their offices in
london. CDs (and other negotiable paper) at the lon-
don offices of Japanese banks increased from $1.5
billion in November 1976 to $4.6 billion in November
1978. Source: Bank of England Quarterly, various is-
sues.
20. While precise quantification is not possible, the
difference in orientation of the agencies and branches
suggests that there are limits to the ability of Japanese
banks to shift business from their subsidiaries to their
agencies and branches.
21. For Japanese banks, the structural characteristics
refer to the agencies and branches. The subsidiary
commercial-bank structure is closer to the structure of
domestic U.S. banks.
22. In recent years, branches of U.S. banks have in fact
shifted from net borrowers to small net suppliers of
funds in foreign interbank markets, largely because of
inflows of funds from oil-producing countriesas well as
large advances of funds from their head offices.23. This total includes advances from the head office
and related branches in other foreign countries.
24. It is estimated that in 1976,80percent of Japanese
exports and 99 percent of Japanese imports were
invoiced in. non-yen curr~ncies, mainly dollars. An-
dr~(iS Prindl, "What's Happening to the Yen Shift?,"
Euromoney, Septernber1973, g.30.
25. Simply.using•dollar and yen.Iending rates.would
nothave been practical, since nominalrates are influ-
enced by inflation and exchangeerate expectations.
Also, U.S. banks in Japan extend dollaras well as yen-
denominated credits to nonbank borrowers.
26. Since the UnitedStates is areserve-currency coun-
try, it is not meaningful to consider its international
reserveeasset position.
27. For a description of the declinein the "impact" loan
activity by U.S. banks, see Thomas H. Hanley, "The
Economic, Financial, andCompetitiveChallenges FaCe
ing Mutlinational Banks in Japan," Salomon Brothers,
May 1978.
30
28. This was part of the "tiering" of the Euromarkets
tllat occurred following the Herstatt and Franklin inci-
dents.
29. All statistical series, including trade data compiled
by the Bank of Japan, are in dol.lar amounts, ex.cept
total loans and discounts of the Japanese City Banks,
which were converted intodollarterms using prevailing
E;xch(inge rates.
30.<Single-date balance-sheet data may exhibit SOme
rCindom fluctuations, due to financial conditions preva-
lent on the particular day for which the data are ob-
served.
31. For all Japanese institutions (including sUbsidiary
commercial banks) in the United States, the estimated
impactofa$1-hillionincreasein local bank lending was
increased from $40.7 million to $54.8 million when the
comparison was limited to weekly reporting banks in
the three major states.